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REZUMAT.  O serie de studii şi definiţii ale vulnerabilitatii sistemelor electro-energetice au fost publicate, cu luarea în 
consideraţie a multiplelor aspecte complexe, dar conducând la ambiguităţi în utilizarea practică. De aceea, în această 
lucrare se propune o clasificare clară pentru evaluarea vulnerabilităţii, cu izolarea diferitelor origini. Prin aceasta structurare 
se pot evidenţia si prioritiza ameninţările, obţinându-se o mai buna înţelegere a punctelor slabe in care se pot dezvolta 
vulnerabilităţi. Un model generic pentru vulnerabilităţile sistemului electro-energetic, în special al celor operaţionale,  poate 
fi dezvoltat ulterior, in vederea diminuării acestora. 
 
Cuvinte cheie: lanţ de evenimente, sistem electro-energetic, securitate, susceptibilitate, vulnerabilitate 
 
ABSTRACT. Many studies and definitions of vulnerability have been published considering multiple aspects collectively 
which resulted in ambiguities in practical use. Therefore, a clear classification for vulnerability assessment isolating 
different dimensions of the origins of vulnerability is proposed in this paper. Under the framework, focuses can be brought 
on a specific dimension for a better understanding of where the system vulnerability arises. A generic pattern of system 
vulnerabilities, especially operational vulnerabilities, can be subsequently developed for its mitigation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With entanglement of the power systems 
infrastructures with other critical fundamental 
infrastructures rather than traditionally vertical and self-
sustained system, as well as the internal changes inside 
the power system, such as growing penetration of 
renewable energy sources, deepening markets and 
development of the ICT systems, electricity 
infrastructures are more vulnerable to the threats that 
could happen to any aspect of the “open” system 
nowadays. 
The rapid and massive deployment of renewable 
energies based distributed generation and “intelligent” 
equipment provides much more potentials for the 
system to fail. For example, the introducing of smart 
meters provides a large number of access points to 
hackers to initiate malicious cyber attacks; the shift of 
pure consumers at the final end to prosumers with 
distributed generation using renewable energies such as 
photovoltaic panels and micro-CHPs alters the easily 
controllable unilateral power flow to ad hoc bilateral 
power flows. These changes generate new vulnerable 
points in the systems that have never been foreseen. 
Therefore, the necessities of vulnerability analysis 
system for electricity infrastructures are urgently 
needed to be addressed. 
Although vulnerability draws many attentions, there 
is no common definition widely accepted. Thywissen 
[1] lists 29 different definitions for the term 
vulnerability in the literature due to different purposes 
of the studies. Most of the definitions are related to 
vulnerability of societies but not the vulnerability of the 
system itself. Similarly, differences of definitions of 
vulnerability can be found for different infrastructures 
as well [2 – 8]. Despite of the verities in the definitions, 
a common characteristic of vulnerability is implied that 
system vulnerability is closely connected to the system 
ability to keep its functionality when exposed to 
materialized threats. In some definitions, the ability of 
function restoration is also included [1]. In addition, 
several factors (physical, social, economic, and 
environmental) that have an influence on the 
vulnerability of a system can be considered [3 – 7]. 
To identify the vulnerability, two aspects must be 
involved: threat capability and control strength [17]. 
Threat capability is a measure of the severity of a 
possible incident in terms of the gravity of the damage 
it may cause, while a control refers to the measures or 
changes which reduce its vulnerability. For example, a 
transmission line might be destroyed by a storm, which 
depends on the severity of the storm itself and the 
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strength of the line forged by the length and 
construction materials. Although the example 
demonstrates the two key aspects of the vulnerability 
consideration, it only concerns a component of the 
system. In contrast, vulnerability of a system is more 
complex and inclined to evaluate the operative 
functionalities of the system with multiple components 
dynamically respond to the changes triggered by a 
threat. Therefore, vulnerability identification of the 
system may refer either to the system susceptibility 
(tendency of the system creating unwanted events 
subject to a threat), or to an explicitly designed 
countermeasure against a certain threat. 
Most of the current vulnerability studies differentiate 
component vulnerability and system vulnerability, 
which makes the terminology and results ambiguous 
and impractical to use. Moreover, besides the 
component or the system points of view, vulnerability 
can also be observed from structural and operational 
dimensions. Therefore, we firstly need to clarify the 
vulnerability evaluation system by providing a 
framework which isolates different considerations and 
views in vulnerability studies. In this way, we can 
describe the origins of the vulnerability distinctively. 
2. CALSSIFICATION OF VULNERABILITY 
ASSESSMENT FOR ELECTRICITY 
INFRASTRUCTURES 
Various frameworks for vulnerability evaluation 
have been proposed in previous studies with specific 
focuses, such as individual components, effects, etc. For 
example, reference [9], proposed a method for assessing 
voltage security and ranked vulnerable buses with 
respect to voltage security only. Therefore, the results 
of such studies would be difficult to be applied to a 
broader and generic scenario. However, one of the 
purposes of a vulnerability analysis is to identify events 
during the evolutions of the failure (a chain of events) 
leading to critical situations with huge negative 
consequences.  
In this paper, we propose a framework to isolate 
different aspects so that we can concentrate on each 
specific origin of vulnerability, which could eventually 
facilitate the development of system responses to 
possible crisis situations and create an awareness of 
vulnerability management and the necessity of such 
assessments. 
Two general aspects of vulnerability evaluation 
would be studied either from the structural point of 
view or from the operational point of view. So, the 
evaluation system should be divided into two the 
aspects firstly as shown in figure 1. 
 
The Evaluation of electricity infrastructures  Vulnerability
Structural Vulnerability Operational Vulnerability
Static Dynamic
 
 
Fig. 1. Classification of vulnerability assessment for electricity 
infrastructures   
 
Structural Vulnerability. Structural vulnerability 
refers to the weakest components or their 
interconnections in the topologies of the physical 
infrastructures which could cause a large loss of system 
functionalities. Morakis et al. [10] define vulnerability 
as a “measure of the exploitability of a weakness”. In 
structural engineering, the term vulnerability is often 
used to capture the “susceptibility of a component or a 
system to some external action”. Thus, a structure is 
vulnerable if “any small damage produces 
disproportionately large consequences” [11]. 
Structural vulnerability intrinsically depends on the 
structure of the network and is independent from the 
operational status of the system. Power system 
structural vulnerability is based on the graphical 
representation of a network considering the specificities 
of power systems; therefore it is a physical property of 
the system, which means even if the system is not in 
operation, the structural vulnerable points still exist. 
However, in order to observe this kind of 
vulnerabilities, operation is needed to exceed the 
maximal capability of these vulnerable points. 
Many researchers have embraced the idea of 
structural vulnerability and made pioneer studies on the 
power systems. For example, an analysis of the 
structural vulnerability of the Italian power grid, using a 
graph-based model of cascading failures can be found 
in [12]. Carreras et al. [13] use a linear approximation 
and standard optimization to represent cascading 
transmission line overloads to identify the vulnerable 
branches in the system.  
Operational Vulnerability. Operational vulnerabi-
lity refers to the most dangerous phenomena that can 
lead to a large loss of system functionalities during the 
operation. Large loss of system functionalities is 
usually caused by cascading failures leading to 
operational constraints violations (usually static 
problems like overload, over voltage, etc.) or 
instabilities (usually dynamic problems, like oscillation, 
loss of synchronization, etc.) in the power grids. Power 
system instability can be caused by transient instability, 
dynamic instability or voltage instability [18]. 
Therefore, not only the static aspect is interesting to be 
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studied for the operational vulnerability, but also 
dynamic phenomenon should be included. 
The system operation status is constantly changing; 
therefore, the operational vulnerability is shifting 
accordingly and not easy to detect and define. One of 
the most challenging problems is that system operators 
have no precise idea of the system security. During the 
operation, they may face insecure states due to events 
much different from what were predicted in the 
planning and other online/off-line studies. Since such 
events are somehow unexpected, the operators do not 
have enough security information or available 
resources/countermeasures to take timely preventive or 
emergency control actions. There were several large 
blackouts illustrating it: In July 1987 the system 
operators of TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) 
just watched their system voltage decreasing while the 
load was increasing fast till voltage collapse occurred 
after they run off their reactive power supply[14]; In 
August 1996, the BPA operators did not know that their 
system was insecure after a key transmission line was 
disconnected following several line outages in the 
Western Interconnection System[15] [16]; in July 1996, 
a large area blackout happened in Idaho, which the 
system simulations after that showed that if appropriate 
load shedding had been taken at that area for half an 
hour, the blackout could have been prevented [15,16]. 
It is manifest that the blackouts listed in the above 
examples are closely related with the operational 
vulnerabilities. The cascades might have been limited to 
a certain extend if the operational vulnerabilities can be 
detected ex ante with more general approaches and 
tools. To quickly scan the operational vulnerability 
under emergencies usually requires a lot of calculations 
with multiple focuses on different aspects and events. If 
there is a generic pattern pointing out where the system 
operation would most probably go wrong, attentions 
can be focused primarily on the most vulnerable points 
in the operation.  
Nevertheless, it is not easy to form the common 
pattern purely by simulation. The observation from 
history of blackouts and the corresponding chains of 
events can be efficiently provides information to 
identify the most operational vulnerability of a system. 
For forming the common paten, firstly the most 
vulnerable elements of the network after the 
materialization of a threat need to be identified, and 
then the most probable effects of failures of such 
vulnerable components need to be captured. This also 
requires the study of the evolution of the system in 
operation during the cascades, which enhance the 
operational vulnerability. 
In this way, studies of the historic blackouts are 
needed as an efficient way of vulnerability observation.  
3. CONCLUSIONS 
Vulnerability assessment has been always a 
challenging concern in power systems, and there have 
been many studies conducted to evaluate different 
aspects of vulnerabilities. However, there is no general 
classification framework which clearly individualizes 
each aspect of vulnerabilities from components to 
system, and from structural point of view to the 
operation level. From the system vulnerability point of 
view, we discussed that the vulnerability could emerge 
not only from the structure but also from the operation. 
Therefore, we proposed a framework to isolate different 
aspects to enable the detection of the origins of the 
system vulnerable points. Considering the difficulties of 
detecting operational vulnerability, studying of the 
cascading failures (chain of events) in historic blackouts 
could provide an excellent observation as to from where 
the vulnerability arises in operation. 
Under this framework, deliberately designed tool to 
quickly grasp a specific blackout without too many 
details can be employed to abstract the common pattern 
of operational vulnerabilities. In this way, the analysis 
could help to improve the system incident response to 
possible critical situations and provide a basis for 
prioritizing among different possible vulnerable points. 
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